Recent research has underlined the efficiency of the GATT/WTO rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments, emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefÞcient. Global free trade, in particular, is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, provided that governments have distributive motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a better, welfare superior, equilibrium. The reason is that members of regional trade agreements tend to reduce their multilateral tariffs as they lower trade barriers against their regional partners. Once we account for these endogenous changes-and only then-we Þnd that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. We also Þnd, however, that members are likely to gain "too much" from regional integration, thereby harming outsiders.
Introduction
The world trading system has experienced signiÞcant liberalization since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. Average ad valorem tariffs on manufactured goods, for example, have fallen since then from about 40 percent to less than 5 percent. More recently, while keeping cooperation at the multilateral level through continuing negotiations-now under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), created in 1995 to expand the GATT to new areas-countries have become also increasingly engaged in initiatives of trade liberalization at the regional/preferential level. As a result, there are now over 150 regional trade agreements in force, with several others being currently negotiated worldwide.
In this paper, recognizing the realities of the world trading system, we analyze the implications of these preferential initiatives of trade liberalization for economic efficiency and global welfare in an environment characterized by signiÞcant cooperation at the multilateral level. In line with recent political economy research, we assume that governments care about national welfare but are also inßuenced by special interest groups. As Grossman and Helpman (1995a) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) point out, these distributive motivations tend to make global free trade-the policy that would maximize aggregate world efficiency-unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, simply because politically motivated governments do not have efficiency as their sole goal. In such a context, an agreement among a subset of countries to eliminate tariffs on imports from one another, as they do when engaging in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), would reduce aggregate trade barriers while promoting trade discrimination. As the regionalism literature has emphasized since Viner (1950) , the former effect tends to enhance aggregate efficiency, whereas the latter tends to reduce it. These contradictory forces have been at the center of the unresolved controversies about preferential liberalization.
In this paper, we show that in a political but fully cooperative world, this key ambiguity regarding the effects of regionalism can be resolved. The reason is that the multiple forces shaping multilateral cooperation induce members of PTAs to reduce their external tariffs as an endogenous response to the trade diversion that the preferential blocs would otherwise generate. With lower external tariffs, the aggregate restrictions to trade are further reduced while trade discrimination is moderated. We show that these endogenous changes in external tariffs ensure that the formation of preferential trade agreements can enhance aggregate economic efficiency.
Several authors have indicated the inadequacy of the (until recently) common practice of taking the external tariffs of countries forming PTAs as exogenously given. After all, the beneÞts and costs of tariffs applied on distinct sources of imports are generally interdependent, and this interdependence can be signiÞcant. Richardson (1993) was the Þrst to point out that a free trade agreement would induce members to reduce their external tariffs. Bagwell and Staiger (1999b) termed this positive relationship between tariffs applied to different sources of imports "tariff complementarity." Employing distinct settings, Bond et al. (2002) and Ornelas (2002a) show, in addition, that the reduction of external tariffs by members of free trade areas tends to be deep enough to enhance trade even between bloc members and non-members. Other authors (e.g. Krugman 1991 and Cadot et al. 1999) suggest that there may be forces pushing for higher external tariffs as well, especially when integration takes the form of a customs union.
So far, however, this literature has been restricted to non-cooperative (multilateral) settings. In this paper, we extend that literature by analyzing how the formation of PTAs affects external tariffs and global welfare in a cooperative multilateral environment. We show, in particular, that the tariff complementarity effect generalizes to cooperative environments as well.
This paper relates also to the line of research that focuses on the compatibility between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization in political economy settings. Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998) , for example, analyze whether the formation of PTAs tends to help or hinder the prospects of global free trade. Interestingly, despite using very distinct frameworks, Levy and Krishna obtain essentially the same result: preferential trade agreements can render global free trade unfeasible. Thus, they regard regionalism as a "stumbling block" of multilateral free trade.
As indicated above, however, politically motivated governments would generally stop short of establishing global free trade even if they fully cooperate with each other. Accordingly, rather than asking how the formation of PTAs would affect the political feasibility of general free trade, as Levy and Krishna do, we take a different approach. First, we characterize a feasible multilateral trade agreement, with the feasibility constraint shaped by the governments' political preferences. We then analyze how the formation of PTAs would affect such an agreement. As indicated above, the answer we Þnd contrasts sharply with the results of Levy and Krishna: PTAs tend to improve aggregate world welfare, bringing the multilateral trading system closer (in terms of economic efficiency) to global free trade.
1
On the surface, this result may appear inconsistent with the Þndings of Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) . Focusing on the efficiency properties of the GATT negotiating rules, they show that trade negotiations that follow the principle of reciprocity deliver an efficient multilateral trade agreement, from the perspective of the negotiating governments, if and only if negotiations also abide by the principle of non-discrimination. But since PTAs are discriminatory by nature, according to Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, p. 218) , "preferential agreements pose a threat to the efficiency properties of the existing multilateral system."
In the present paper, we take a distinct perspective. As in standard welfare analyses, we focus on economic efficiency, rather than on the political efficiency emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger. We do not study GATT's negotiation rules either. Instead, we follow Grossman and Helpman (1995a) and simply assume that governments can bargain efficiently, thus reaching an agreement that maximizes their joint payoff. In such a context, PTAs disrupt the governments' fully cooperative equilibrium and lower the governments' joint payoff, as in Bagwell and Staiger's setting. However, politically efficient equilibria are not economically efficient if governments have political motivations. Accordingly, disturbances to such equilibria, as those induced by PTAs, may be economically desirable. We show that PTAs can indeed enhance long run aggregate economic efficiency and world welfare.
After examining the effects of PTAs on global welfare, we turn to their distributional effects across countries. Starting from the revealed preference argument that governments seek regional integration only if doing so beneÞts them, we Þnd that a PTA must increase the bargaining power of the regional partners, vis-à-vis the outsiders, in multilateral negotiations. Otherwise, the reduction of external tariffs, which the non-member countries would receive "for free," would imply that the payoff of at least one of the governments forming the PTA-and possibly of both-would fall with the arrangement.
We show that the necessary change in relative forces in the multilateral negotiations induced by a PTA not only beneÞts the member governments; it also ensures that welfare will increase in the PTA countries. That comes, however, at the expense of countries left out of the arrangement, where welfare falls. Hence, even though regionalism can raise aggregate world welfare, the distribution of gains can be very uneven, with PTA members reaping more than the extra aggregate beneÞts generated by the regional bloc, thereby harming non-members.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we characterize a multilateral trade agreement, while in Section 4 we assess the effects of trade liberalization and trade discrimination on global welfare. The consequences of preferential trade agreements on external tariffs and on aggregate efficiency and welfare are assessed in Section 5. In Section 6 we consider the distributive consequences of PTAs. We conclude in Section 7.
Model

Basic Structure
We consider a three-country, N -good competitive model. We make a "natural importer" assumption under which, for identical prices in all three countries, the natural importer imports the good in question from the other two countries.
Consumers have quasi-linear objective functions of the form U = x 0 + P N−1 k=1 u k (x k ). All goods are produced under constant returns to scale. Goods labeled x 1 , ..., x N −1 require labor and a sector-speciÞc factor to be produced, while good x 0 needs labor only. DeÞning x 0 as the numeraire, the wage rate is set to unity. Under this structure, sector x 0 absorbs all kinds of general equilibrium effects, effectively making the remaining N − 1 sectors independent of each other. This allows us to concentrate the analysis on only one of those sectors. We let the natural importer in such a sector be country 1, and call it Home.
In country i, the owners of the sector-speciÞc factor employed in the sector under analysis obtain rents represented by Π i (p i ), i = 1, 2, 3, where p i denotes country i's domestic price. Supply of that product in country i is given
0 " denotes the derivative of univariate functions.] The natural importer assumption requires S 1 (p o ) < S j (p o ) for any p o , j = 2, 3. We assume demand functions are symmetric across countries and negatively sloped:
Trade Policy Instruments and Market Equilibrium
We focus on import tariffs, abstracting from export subsidies. Since we will consider that countries choose their multilateral trade policies cooperatively, the disregard of export subsidies is inconsequential. After all, as Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) show, only net tariffs (i.e., the import tariff minus the correspondent export subsidy) matter for negotiation. Thus, although we refer only to import tariffs, they could be straightforwardly re-interpreted as the correspondent net tariffs.
2 Denoting Home's (speciÞc) tariff on imports from country j by τ j , and provided that τ j is not prohibitively high, arbitrage conditions link prices in the three countries as follows:
Moreover, markets must clear, so the equilibrium local price satisÞes (using the arbitrage condition)
where b p denotes Home's local equilibrium price. In the present setting, where no country is "small" in the theoretical sense, there is an incomplete pass-through from tariffs to prices. Thus, if Home increases its tariff against imports from any of the two countries, the effect on Home's local price is positive but lower than the increase in the tariff. This can be seen by totally differentiating the market-clearing condition:
Setting dτ i = 0, this expression can be rearranged as
Since ρ j (τ i , τ j ) < 1, Home improves its terms of trade vis-à-vis country j when it raises τ j . An analogous expression can be derived for
Governments' Objectives
Governments care about both general economic conditions and distributive issues in their own countries. While there are several possible ways of representing such preferences, here we employ a reduced-form representation that weighs aggregate welfare and producers' surplus. The reason is two fold. First, our focus is not on analyzing the sources of governments' political motivations. Moreover, Baldwin (1987) shows that an objective function that weighs national welfare and producers' surplus can indeed represent the reduced-form of most political economy frameworks. 3 This speciÞcation implies that governments effectively behave as if they were more concerned with producers' welfare than with consumers' welfare.
Thus, deÞning national welfare (W ) as the sum of consumers' surplus, tariff revenue and producers' surplus, 4 governments' payoffs are represented as
Note in these deÞnitions that we assign the same extra weight to producers' surplus for the two exporting countries' governments, γ e − 1 ≥ 0. This is unessential and assumed mainly to reduce notation. By contrast, those weights are generally distinct from Home's extra weight on producers' surplus, γ m − 1 ≥ 0. Thus, we allow the political inßuence of importers and exporters to differ from one another.
3 Multilateral Cooperation
Non-Cooperative Trade Equilibrium
In the absence of multilateral cooperation, each government implements trade policies without taking into account the consequences for the rest of the world. In such a context, governments attempt to shift the cost of their own restrictive trade policies to foreign countries, typically producing inefficient outcomes. Mutually beneÞcial trade agreements can eliminate these types of inefficiencies. In 3 Baldwin's (1987) result also incorporates the later-published and inßuential political economy representation of Grossman and Helpman (1994) , who posit that governments are concerned with the well-being of the average voter as well as with campaign contributions received from special interest groups. In that case, Baldwin's reduced-form representation applies when producers are capable of organizing themselves in politically active lobbies and provided that their actions are not fully counteracted by other active lobbies with opposing interests-in which case the government's extra weight on producers' surplus would be nil. 4 Note that we refer only to welfare related to the production and consumption of the product in analysis. This independent sectoral analysis is possible because of the separability due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function. this paper, we focus on equilibria characterized by arrangements of that nature. Still, it is useful to specify Þrst the non-cooperative equilibrium, as it provides a benchmark that allows us to highlight the inefficiencies that can be eliminated by a multilateral trade agreement-and those that cannot.
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the Home government chooses tariffs to maximize its individual payoff:
Evaluated at the equilibrium (and dropping the arguments of ρ 3 for notational ease), the Þrst-order necessary condition (FONC) that characterizes τ
Using equation 2 and the market-clearing condition, this expression can be rewritten as
Assuming that the second-order condition is satisÞed, equation 5 implicitly deÞnes Home's non-cooperative tariff against imports from country 3 for any given τ 2 , τ n 3 (τ 2 ). Four distinct forces shape τ n 3 (τ 2 ). The Þrst is politics. Since a higher τ 3 raises the domestic price, it beneÞts the domestic producers. Thus, if the domestic producers are politically more inßuential than consumers-i.e., if γ m > 1-they induce increased protection against country 3. This effect is reßected in the Þrst element of equation 5. Note that, for a given γ m , the domestic industry is more effective in inducing protection the larger is its output.
The second element is equation 5, τ 3 M 0 (b p)ρ 3 < 0, represents the inefficiency caused by the tariff through a reduction in the import volume. This term is unambiguously negative and hence pushes for a lower tariff.
The third term of equation 5,
, denotes the effect created by discrimination among distinct sources of imports. Whenever a tariff is altered, it changes the source of some of the imports. In particular, as τ 3 increases, Home relocates imports from country 3 to country 2. But if τ 3 > τ 2 , marginal costs are lower in country 3, since b
Hence, in that case the dislocation of imports from country 3 to country 2 corresponds to an inefficient shift to a higher-cost supplier. [Clearly, the opposite happens if τ 3 < τ 2 .] This effect corresponds to the well-known trade diversion identiÞed by Viner (1950) , and is reßected in the lower tariff proceeds that Home collects when it shifts imports from country 3 to country 2. Naturally, this effect vanishes under the WTO requirement of non-discrimination (MFN treatment).
The last force represented in equation 5 corresponds to terms of trade effects. These motivations correspond to the familiar "optimal tariff" argument identiÞed by Johnson (1953-4 )-although we consider a three-, rather than Johnson's two-country, environment. Here, because ρ 3 < 1, an increase in τ 3 is not fully passed to Home's domestic price, thereby implying a fall in b p 3 = b p − τ 3 . Accordingly, Home experiences a terms of trade improvement against country 3. Conversely, b p 2 = b p − τ 2 rises with a higher τ 3 , deteriorating Home's terms of trade vis-à-vis country 2.
An expression analogous to equation 5 can be obtained for τ n 2 (τ 3 ) as well. The two equations can then be straightforwardly solved for Home's optimal non-cooperative tariffs {τ n 2 , τ n 3 }.
Cooperative Trade Equilibrium
We describe now the cooperative multilateral trade equilibrium. As Grossman and Helpman (1995a), we assume governments can bargain efficiently over their trade policies. Since the marginal utility of income is Þxed at unity in all three countries, the cooperative tariffs are unaffected by the distribution of income across countries. As a result, the ensuing cooperative equilibrium entails a set of tariffs that simply maximizes the government's joint payoffs.
5 This set of politically efficient tariffs thus satisÞes
Making use of equation 5, the FONC that characterizes τ pe 3 can be written, when evaluated at the equilibrium, as
or equivalently as
Assuming that the second-order condition is satisÞed (in the next section we provide a condition to ensure that it is), equation 7 implicitly deÞnes Home's politically efficient tariff against imports from country 3 for any given τ 2 , τ pe 3 (τ 2 ). Three distinct forces shape τ pe 3 (τ 2 ). The Þrst is politics. Since ρ 3 ∈ (0, 1), producers competing with country 3's Þrms gain, while country 3's own producers lose from a higher τ 3 . Thus, whereas the former pushes for more protection against imports from country 3, the latter does the opposite. Hence, under multilateral cooperation foreign countries' politically organized groups become represented in the policy-making process, in contrast with the non-cooperative case. This political dimension of multilateral cooperation is reßected in the Þrst square bracket of equation 7. Politics' net effect on τ 3 depends on the relative political strengths of the two groups, which in turn depend on the political parameters γ m and γ e and on the correspondent stakes: everything else constant, the producers in a country are more inßuent in shaping policies the larger is their output, relative to the output of producers in the other countries.
The other two forces shaping τ pe 3 (τ 2 ) represent, respectively, the inefficiency caused by the tariff on the volume of imports and the (in)efficiency caused by (an increase) a reduction in the discrimination between the two sources of imports. These forces are are unaffected by multilateral cooperation, and therefore represented identically in FONCs 7 and 5.
By contrast, the terms of trade motivations present in the non-cooperative equilibrium (equation 5) are absent in the cooperative equilibrium (equation 7). This should come as no surprise. After all, as Grossman and Helpman (1995a) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) make clear, terms of trade manipulations correspond to "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, and as such they are neutralized when countries set trade policies cooperatively.
An expression analogous to equation 7 can be obtained for τ pe 2 (τ 3 ). The two equations can then be straightforwardly solved for Home's politically efficient tariffs {τ pe 2 , τ pe 3 }. The important point to note here is that politically efficient tariffs are not economically efficient. Tariffs that maximize global efficiency are equivalent to tariffs that maximize world aggregate welfare, which satisfy
the solution to problem 6 when γ m = γ e = 1. Using FONC 7, it is easy to see that economically efficient tariffs {τ * 2 , τ *
Unsurprisingly, the solution of this system has τ * 2 = τ * 3 = 0, so global economic efficiency is achieved only under free trade. Lemma 1 follows from these observations. Lemma 1 If governments have distributional concerns (i.e., if γ m > 1 and/or γ e > 1), {τ pe 2 , τ pe 3 } 6 = {τ * 2 , τ * 3 } = {0, 0}. Thus, politically efficient tariffs are economically inefficient.
Hence, whereas a fully cooperative multilateral trade agreement delivers an outcome that is optimal from the perspective of its negotiators-namely, governments with distributional concerns-it generally yields an economically inefficient outcome.
In such a second-best context, developments in the world trading system that alter the outcome of the cooperative multilateral equilibrium, as e.g. the creation of preferential trade agreements, may be desirable from an efficiency perspective. We evaluate this possibility in the remainder of the paper.
Clear-cut results are obtainable, however, only in a more restricted setting. Accordingly, we specialize the subsequent analysis to a linear version of the present model. While this specialization-obviously-limits the generality of the ensuing results, it is nonetheless enough for the main purpose of this paper: to show that preferential trade agreements can improve upon a fully cooperative multilateral equilibrium. The linear version of the model specializes the previous framework as follows: D(p i ) = A − bp i , S 1 (p 1 ) = cp 1 and S j (p j ) = dp j , j = 2, 3, where {A, b, c, d} are strictly positive constants and d > c, consistently with the natural importer assumption. It follows that
2 ). Since now ρ 3 and ρ 2 are constant and equal to each other, we simplify notation henceforth by deÞning ρ ≡ ρ 2 = ρ 3 .
Trade Liberalization vs. Trade Discrimination
The controversies regarding preferential liberalization stem from the ambiguous character of the changes it inßicts on the global trading environment. Thus, it is helpful to begin by identifying the trade-offs preferential trade agreements entail for global efficiency.
A PTA, while promoting trade liberalization, also creates trade discrimination. The former is normally viewed as a positive effect, whereas the latter is typically considered an undesirable consequence. In the present framework, trade liberalization and trade discrimination display these characteristics too: everything else constant, the former (latter) improves (decreases) world welfare. DeÞning the degree of trade discrimination as ∆ ≡ τ j − τ i ≥ 0 and the degree of trade restrictiveness as Υ ≡ τ j + τ i , for i, j = 2, 3, i 6 = j, the following lemma proves this claim.
Lemma 2 Everything else equal, world welfare decreases when the degree of either trade discrimination or trade restrictiveness increases. That is, dΩ/d∆ ≤ 0 and dΩ/dΥ ≤ 0, with strict inequality if ∆ > 0 and Υ > 0, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 outlines the standard welfare ambiguity of preferential trade agreements. By reducing aggregate restrictions to trade, PTAs tend to increase world welfare; by promoting trade discrimination, they tend to reduce world welfare. We must, however, recognize that neither Υ nor ∆ is exogenous. In the present framework, a PTA between Home and, say country 2, would require τ 2 = 0. But under that constraint, Home's politically efficient tariff against imports from country 3 would tend to change as well. Hence, whereas the introduction of a PTA constrains one dimension of both Υ and ∆, governments will generally want to adjust the unconstrained dimensions of Υ and ∆ to the new equilibrium. When assessing the global welfare effects of preferential arrangements, one must account for these induced equilibrium changes.
In the old regionalism literature-as well as in some recent contributionsendogenous adjustments in external tariffs were commonly disregarded. In that context, several authors have suggested that the negative aspect of PTAs (trade discrimination) would tend to prevail over their positive aspect (trade liberalization). A similar result arises here: if the tariff applied on one import source is kept Þxed, world welfare is greater under non-discrimination (when the other tariff is set at the same level) than under full discrimination (when the other tariff is eliminated). Yet a departure from uniform tariffs increases world welfare if the resulting degree of trade discrimination is sufficiently small. The following proposition proves these claims.
Proposition 1 Starting from a non-discriminatory trade regime with strictly positive tariffs and keeping one of the tariffs constant:
(i) A small reduction in the other tariff enhances global welfare: for any τ ,
(ii) The elimination of the other tariff reduces global welfare: for any τ ,
Proof. (i) It follows from the proof of Lemma 2 that, for a given level of global welfare,
Without discrimination (∆ = 0), the value of this expression is nil, implying that a small increase in ∆ would require no accompanying decrease in Υ to keep world welfare constant. A small decrease in one tariff, which increases ∆ while at the same time decreasing Υ, must therefore raise Ω.
(ii) Rewrite Ω(τ, τ) as
Hence, starting from a non-discriminatory situation, the elimination of one tariff lowers aggregate world welfare.
Proposition 1 shows that preferential trade liberalization can improve world efficiency only if discrimination does not increase "too much." Starting from nondiscriminatory tariffs, a small enough reduction in one tariff, while keeping the other Þxed, enhances world welfare. Eventually, however, the cost of a further rise in discrimination overcomes the gains from additional trade liberalization. This result underlines the potential harm of discriminatory schemes of trade liberalization emphasized in the regionalism literature.
On the surface, the proposition is also suggestive that the GATT's requirements for preferential liberalization may be inappropriate. Under its Article XXIV, the GATT allows countries to deviate from MFN treatment when forming free trade areas or customs unions, but it requires countries to eliminate (or at least "substantially reduce") trade barriers against each other as a precondition for preferential liberalization.
6 Since Proposition 1 asserts that preferential arrangements establishing internal free trade among their members lower aggregate efficiency, one may then be tempted to deem GATT's requirement of complete internal liberalization responsible for creating inefficiencies in preferential schemes of trade liberalization.
7 However, one must note that Proposition 1 holds under the assumption of Þxed external tariffs.
As indicated in the Introduction, several authors have shown that countries forming PTAs have incentives to reduce their external tariffs. And even though analyses of the endogenous changes in external tariffs have so far largely disregarded cooperation at the multilateral level, we show in the next section that a similar outcome can be expected under multilateral cooperation. Once we account for the endogenous changes in external tariffs, the expected welfare impact of a PTA is then critically altered.
Since the very basic idea of regional integration is to liberalize trade beyond the levels achieved by multilateral cooperation, we assume henceforth that multilateral cooperation alone is incapable of delivering global free trade-i.e., we require politically efficient tariffs to be strictly positive. This assumption is employed also to make the analysis consistent with the pervasive anti-trade bias observed in trade policies throughout the world (Rodrik 1995) . We also disregard the less interesting case in which cooperative tariffs are prohibitive. These conditions amount to imposing constraints on the political parameters γ e and γ m .
Condition 1 Politically efficient MFN tariffs are strictly positive and nonprohibitive. This is equivalent to imposing the following constraints on the political parameters: 6 GATT's Article XXIV also disallows members to increase their external tariffs upon formation of the PTA. However, as we show in the next section, this condition is immaterial, since in equilibrium the integrating countries tend instead to reduce their external tariffs. 7 We must, however, note that GATT's article XXIV has hardly been enforced. In fact, the degree of implementation varies signiÞcantly across the more than 150 agreements formally in force. While in some cases members follow a policy of strict internal free trade (as e.g. in the Andean Community), in others internal trade barriers have barely been affected by the formal creation of the bloc (as for example in the Latin America Integration Association). Still, from a normative standpoint, it is useful to consider the appropriateness of GATT's rules for preferential liberalization. Proof. See Appendix. Levy (1999) shows that, if importing-competing and export-oriented industries had the same political inßuence over trade policies, a fully cooperative multilateral equilibrium would be characterized by import subsidies. Condition 1.i deÞnes the exact degree by which the political inßuence of import-competing industries need to overcome the political inßuence of export-oriented ones to prevent this rarely observed outcome. Condition 1.ii, in turn, simply rules out prohibitive cooperative tariffs. It corresponds to the second-order condition for an interior solution of politically efficient MFN tariffs.
Regionalism under Multilateral Cooperation
The recent spread of regionalism takes place in a world characterized by significant cooperation at the multilateral level. But PTAs restrict their members' set of available trade instruments, so they affect the outcome of multilateral negotiations, as well as their welfare implications. We are now able to analyze these effects.
We begin by demonstrating how, in a cooperative multilateral equilibrium, the reduction of the tariff on one source of imports alters the tariffs imposed on alternative sources. For concreteness, we henceforth refer to country 2 as Home's potential PTA partner, letting country 3 represent the excluded country. Thus, we evaluate how τ pe 3 evolves as τ 2 changes-that is, we study the function τ pe 3 (τ 2 ).
Proposition 2 If Home's tariff on imports from country 2 (τ 2 ) falls, its politically efficient tariff on imports from country 3 (τ pe 3 ) falls as well, albeit to a lesser extent. SpeciÞcally, ρ/(1 − ρ) < dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 < 1.
Proof. Specializing FONC 7 to the linear case, we obtain τ pe 3 as an implicit function of τ 2 :
It is then straightforward to calculate dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 from the expression above:
where the constant k is deÞned as
Now, suppose the Þrst part of the proposition does not hold and dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 ≤ ρ/(1 − ρ). If we use equations 9 and 10, we can rewrite this inequality as
Noting that (b + d)(1 − ρ) = (2b + c + d)ρ, this expression can be rewritten as
or simply as
This contradicts Condition 1.i. Hence, dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 > ρ/(1 − ρ). Suppose now that dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 ≥ 1. If we use equations 9 and 10, we can rewrite this inequality as
Rearranging this expression, we obtain
This contradicts Condition 1.ii. Hence, dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 < 1.
Proposition 2 generalizes the tariff complementarity effect previously identiÞed in non-cooperative settings to a cooperative environment. Tariff complementarity is produced here by a combination of forces that reßect the distinct impact a lower τ 2 has on the various forces shaping τ pe 3 . Note Þrst that, everything else constant, a lower τ 2 increases S 2 while reducing S 1 and S 3 . Since the interests of producers are represented in τ pe 3 proportionally to their stakes in world production, a lower τ 2 then makes the support of the domestic producers for a higher τ 3 less effective. This effect corresponds to the Þrst term inside the square bracket in equation 9. Likewise, a lower τ 2 makes the political support from country 2 producers for a higher τ 3 more effective, while reducing the weight of the opposition from country 3 producers to a higher τ 3 . These last two effects are combined in the second term inside the square bracket of equation 9.
The inefficiency generated by τ 3 on the volume of imports is unaffected by changes in τ 2 -a consequence of the linearity of the model. By contrast, changes in τ 2 alter the inefficiency costs due to trade discrimination. Under a lower τ 2 (provided that τ 2 < τ 3 , the case here), any increase in τ 3 promotes additional relocation of production from low-cost to high-cost suppliers, amplifying trade diversion. Hence, a lower τ 2 raises the cost of increasing τ 3 . This effect corresponds to the last term in parenthesis in equation 9.
Despite the presence of forces pushing to distinct directions, Proposition 2 is unambiguous, since we are considering that Condition 1 is satisÞed. Condition 1 corresponds to an upper bound on γ e /γ m , which is sufficient to ensure that exporters are not powerful enough to turn the politically efficient tariffs into import subsidies. In such a case, where policies display the widely observed anti-trade bias, the force stemming from the exporters' political power is not sufficient to offset the forces stemming from the importers' political power and from the prospect of inefficiencies due to trade diversion. This ensures that there is tariff complementarity: under the countries' cooperative multilateral arrangement, whenever the tariff imposed by a country on one source of imports is exogenously reduced, the tariff on the alternative import source is lowered as well.
We are now ready to evaluate the welfare effects of a preferential trade agreement. Proposition 1 shows that eliminating the tariff on one source of imports decreases world welfare if the tariff applied on competing import sources is kept Þxed. Proposition 2 shows, however, that in a cooperative multilateral environment the elimination of the tariff on one source of imports will induce a reduction in the tariff applied on competing import sources. It remains to be seen whether this endogenous reduction of external tariffs is sufficient to improve global welfare. The next proposition shows that this is indeed the case. This inequality is satisÞed, in particular, if dΩ (τ 2 , τ pe 3 (τ 2 )) /dτ 2 < 0 for all τ 2 ≥ 0. We show here that this sufficient condition holds.
Using the calculations from the proof of Proposition 1, we Þnd
After some manipulation, we note that this expression is negative if and only if
Since dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 < 1 from Proposition 2, the right-hand side of this inequality is positive for any τ 2 ≥ 0. But note that its left-hand side is negative, since
from Proposition 2. Hence, world welfare increases with the PTA.
Thus, whereas a PTA with Þxed external tariffs reduces aggregate welfare, Proposition 3 shows that the tariff complementarity generated under multilateral cooperation reverses that outcome: external tariffs fall with the creation of the PTA deeply enough-in the sense of satisfying requirement 12-to enhance global efficiency. The intuition for this result is as follows. Members of PTAs, by reducing tariffs against outside countries as they liberalize reciprocally, moderate trade discrimination while promoting trade liberalization to levels that would otherwise not be politically feasible. In doing that, they lessen the inefficiencies from trade diversion and amplify trade creation. As a result, levels of global welfare that could not be achieved under strict non-discrimination become feasible under regionalism.
From a normative standpoint, this result redeems GATT's Article XXIV. Although the article has not been effectively enforced, the following proposition suggests that it should.
Proposition 4 When countries choose multilateral trade policies cooperatively and Home forms a PTA with country 2, aggregate efficiency rises with the degree of internal liberalization in the PTA: Ω (τ Proof. From the proof of Proposition 3, we know that dΩ (τ 2 , τ
dτ 2 , the result follows immediately.
Proposition 4 shows that any internal liberalization is beneÞcial once we account for the endogenous changes in external tariffs, but aggregate efficiency is greater, the deeper is internal liberalization. Hence, regionalism would contribute the most to economic efficiency if trade within blocs were fully liberalized, as GATT's Article XXIV proposes.
It is worth analyzing how political economy factors affect the preceding results. After all, global free trade is not achievable through multilateral cooperation precisely because governments have political motivations, in particular those related to the interests of import-competing industries. Proposition 5 shows, however, that the more responsive governments are to import-competing sectors, the stronger the tariff complementarity effect and, in turn, the more effective is regionalism in promoting economic efficiency.
Proposition 5 When countries choose multilateral trade policies cooperatively, an increase in the inßuence of importing-competing industries on the policymaking process, as represented by parameter γ m :
i. raises the politically efficient tariffs; ii. deepens the tariff complementarity effect; iii. magniÞes the positive effect of a PTA on aggregate economic efficiency.
It is often heard in policy circles and among news commentators that protectionist forces have become more inßuential in recent years, keeping governments from advancing multilateral negotiations aimed at further liberalizing global trade. This would certainly represent unpleasant news for the multilateral trading system. However, even if this assessment is correct, the harmful consequences of such a trend would be at least partially neutralized by the regionalism trend. As Proposition 5 indicates, the beneÞcial effects of preferential trade agreements are greater precisely when governments are more responsive to the interests of import-competing industries. This result thus suggests that the regionalism boom may be taking place exactly when it is most needed.
Global Redistribution Under Regionalism
In this section, we study how a PTA redistributes payoffs across governments and countries. We Þrst note that a regional trading bloc may alter the balance of forces among countries in multilateral negotiations. The simplest way of representing such changes is to allow the transfers speciÞed in the multilateral agreement to change with the formation of a PTA.
8 As far as aggregate welfare is concerned, transfers are immaterial, but they are important to determine the welfare of individual governments and countries-and to understand how regionalism affects them. To analyze the distribution of gains generated by regional integration, we then need to add some structure to the model, so we can specify how the multilateral transfers are determined. We try to keep the extra structure to a minimum. Recognizing that the formation of a PTA is voluntary, we use only the revealed preference argument that the PTA governments must jointly gain with their integration process.
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Transfers add to national income, so they enter additively in the governments' payoff. In the absence of preferential agreements, we denote the transfers as T i , i = 1, 2, 3; when countries 1 and 2 form a regional trading bloc, we refer to them as T R i , i = 1, 2, 3. In each case, they need to balance, so
In principle, governments' gains with a PTA may derive from two distinct sources. First, their payoffs stemming from national welfare, with the appropriate weights given by equations 4a-4b, may rise with the agreement. Furthermore, the PTA may increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the outside country in multilateral negotiations. We show, however, that the former is not possible in a fully cooperative environment. Therefore, to conclude a preferential agreement, governments must derive beneÞts from increased bargaining power in the multilateral arena that are large enough to make it worthwhile to form the regional bloc.
To prove this claim, we Þrst show that, in a cooperative environment, if transfers are not available, a PTA would necessarily beneÞt the outside government while hurting the integrating governments.
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Lemma 3 When countries choose multilateral trade policies cooperatively but transfers among them are not possible, a PTA beneÞts the government of the outside country but reduces the joint payoff of the two integrating countries. That is,
This result follows because country 3's terms of trade (b p 3 = b p − τ 3 ) improves with the PTA. The reason is that, along with the elimination of τ 2 , the PTA also induces τ 3 to fall, and to do so to an extent that more than offsets the negative effect from discrimination on b p 3 . Country 3's terms of trade (b p 3 = b p − τ 3 ) and national welfare then improve. Since the government places an extra weight on producers' surplus, it perceives this gain as being even greater. The government of the partner country also beneÞts in sectors in which Home is the natural importer-even more than the government of the outside country. Nevertheless, the members' joint payoff must fall with the PTA if transfers are not available.
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To make the integrating countries willing to implement the PTA, the minimum condition that needs to be satisÞed is that, jointly, they gain with the agreement. That is, the transfers need to be such that X i=1,2
Since transfers must balance in each equilibrium, this expression can be rewritten as
The right-hand side of this expression is negative from Lemma 3. Hence, in the cooperative equilibrium, the outside country receives less (pays more) in transfers from (to) the other two countries with the PTA in effect than otherwise.
] to the two sides of inequality 13, we then Þnd that
where the second inequality follows from the deÞnition of the politically efficient equilibrium. Therefore, the outside government necessarily loses with the formation of the regional bloc. This discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Under multilateral cooperation, a PTA can be politically viable only if it gives extra bargaining power to its members vis-à-vis the outside country in multilateral negotiations. This implies that regionalism harms the government of the outside country.
Hence, provided that governments form preferential trade agreements only if they gain from doing so, the governments of the excluded countries necessarily lose. In general, this is not equivalent to saying that welfare should increase in the integrating countries and fall outside the bloc. Under multilateral cooperation, however, the changes in governments' payoffs with a PTA do indeed imply that welfare in their respective countries will change in the same direction, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 7 Under multilateral cooperation, a PTA increases aggregate welfare in its member countries but reduces welfare in the outside country.
Proposition 7 establishes that any preferential trade agreement is attractive to the governments of the member countries will also raise welfare in the region, even though the governments' preferences are not aligned with aggregate welfare in their countries. This result suggests, therefore, that governments will not push their countries into harmful agreements because of their distributional concerns, as often suggested in the regionalism literature-see for example Grossman and Helpman (1995b) . If a government is willing to engage in such an arrangement, it will also beneÞt its country as a whole. Such beneÞts come, however, at the expense of the countries left out of the agreement, even though aggregate world welfare is enhanced.
Concluding Remarks
We analyze in this paper the implications of preferential trade liberalization for global economic efficiency. The analysis is conducted under the assumption that countries cooperate with each other when choosing their multilateral trade policies. This perspective is adopted in recognition of the realities of the world trading system.
We show that the "tariff complementarity" identiÞed by previous authors in non-cooperative settings, which implies that external tariffs should fall when countries engage in preferential trade arrangements, generalizes to cooperative environments as well. This effect is strong enough to ensure that aggregate world welfare increases as a result of preferential liberalization. We Þnd, therefore, that PTAs are helpful in the sense that they induce governments to serve economic efficiency while they pursue their own political ends.
It is worth noting that the tariff complementarity effect is not a purely theoretical concept. In fact, it is entirely consistent with the available (although still scarce) evidence. Foroutan (1998) , for example, shows that members of effectively implemented regional trade agreements are the most active in reducing protection against third countries. Authors focusing on speciÞc trading blocs have generally reached similar conclusions. See for example Bohara et al. (2002) for the case of Mercosur and Krueger (2000) for an analysis of NAFTA.
We also Þnd that regionalism, in spite of its aggregate positive effects on economic efficiency, has also important distributive consequences. In particular, we Þnd that welfare will tend to increase in the member countries, as a result of increased bargaining power in multilateral negotiations obtained with the formation of the regional bloc. But this comes at the expense of the excluded countries, which experience a reduction in welfare with the formation of a PTA. This suggests that countries left out of PTAs may seek to form their own PTAs to strengthen their relative positions in the multilateral arena. If that actually happens, we could then plausibly have a situation where economic efficiency is progressively enhanced with relatively small distributional effects. Clearly, this seems to resemble the developments in the world trading system since the early 1990s. In future research, it would be interesting to model such dynamic interactions explicitly to explore this reasoning in detail.
Since this is, to the best of our knowledge, the Þrst attempt to analyze the consequences of regionalism in a fully cooperative multilateral environment, the analysis can be expanded in several other ways as well. We required, for instance, a linear model to obtain our main results. It remains to be seen whether, or under which conditions, they could be extended to more general settings. It would also be interesting to incorporate institutional features in the analysis. Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) show that a politically efficient multilateral agreement cannot be achieved under GATT's negotiating rules if PTAs are allowed. Here we take a distinct stand, assuming that politically efficient agreements can always be achieved-while accounting for the constraints imposed by PTAs when they are present-and analyzing the effects of PTAs on economic efficiency. A more complete assessment would mix these two approaches, Þrst characterizing the effects of PTAs on the multilateral agreement that is feasible under GATT negotiating rules, then evaluating their implications for global welfare. As indicated above, political (in)efficiency does not imply economic (in)efficiency, so PTAs may generate a politically inefficient but economically superior equilibrium, even if multilateral negotiations abide by GATT's negotiating rules. We leave this extension for future research.
which holds with strictly inequality if Υ > 0.
Using ∂ b p/∂∆ = 0, the effect of a marginal increase in ∆ on world welfare can be similarly calculated:
which simpliÞes to
which holds with strictly inequality if ∆ > 0.
Condition 1 Politically efficient MFN tariffs are strictly positive and nonprohibitive. This is equivalent to imposing the following constraints on the political parameters:
Proof. Under MFN, the tariff is the same regardless of the import source. In such a case, the FONC of the politically efficient tariff corresponds to
where ρ m ≡ db p(τ,τ) dτ = 2ρ denotes the marginal effect of the tariff on Home's equilibrium price. Rewriting the expression above in the linear case, we obtain
It is easy to check that b p = 3A/(3b + c + 2d) + 2ρτ . Substituting this expression for b p in the equality above and reordering it, we Þnd
The coefficient of τ must be negative to satisfy the second-order necessary condition and ensure that the politically efficient tariff has an interior solution:
Provided that the SONC 17 is satisÞed, the politically efficient tariff is then strictly positive iff the coefficient of 3A in equation 16 is positive. It is straightforward to see that this condition amounts to having (γ e − 1) < λ(γ m − 1),
Proof. i. 
Using the Þrst-order condition for τ pe 2 and proceeding analogously, we Þnd that dτ pe 2 (τ 3 , γ m )/dγ m > 0 as well.
ii. The tariff complementarity effect is increasing in γ m iff
> 0. From equations 9 and 10, we have that
iii. To prove the last claim in the proposition, notice that a greater γ m enhances the positive effect of a PTA on aggregate economic efficiency iff, for any γ
We know from the proof of Proposition 3 that dΩ (τ 2 , τ pe 3 (τ 2 )) /dτ 2 < 0 regardless of γ m . Since τ This expression is negative because both terms in its right-hand side are negative. The second term is negative because we consider only situations where τ 2 is reduced from the politically efficient level, τ 2 ≤ τ pe 3 (τ 2)) dτ 2 dτ 2 < 0. This inequality is satisÞed, in particular, if dG 3 (τ 2 , τ pe 3 (τ 2 )) /dτ 2 < 0 for all τ 2 > 0. We show that this condition holds.
Dropping the arguments of E 3 and S 3 for brevity, we rewrite Thus, dG 3 (τ 2 , τ pe 3 (τ 2 )) /dτ 2 < 0 for all τ 2 > 0 iff dτ pe 3 (τ 2 )/dτ 2 > ρ/(1 − ρ), which is true by Proposition 2.
Note now that, by deÞnition, the politically efficient tariffs maximize governments' joint payoff, G 1 + G 2 + G 3 . Thus, this sum must fall under the constraint imposed by the PTA: P i=1,2,3 Proposition 7 Under multilateral cooperation, a PTA increases aggregate welfare in its member countries but reduces welfare in the outside country.
Proof. In the outside country, the change in welfare due to the PTA can be represented as £ W 3 (0, τ pe 3 (0)) + T Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 3, we Þnd that this inequality is equivalent to
Proposition 2 ensures that this inequality holds. Therefore, £ W 3 (0, τ We have just established that the expression in braces is negative. By Proposition 3, the summation above is positive as well, so the PTA necessarily increases aggregate welfare in its member countries.
